Parashat Hayei Sara

Rav Haim Lifshitz

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Parashat Hayei Sara

     Eliezer’s Guess

 Translated from Hebrew by S. NAthan

l'ilui nishmat Esther bat mordechai

Hulin 95, Tosfot asks: “How could Eliezer have done this, according to the view that even a ben Noah is forbidden to use guesses, signs, and omens.”  Torah Temima brings a number of explanations – apparently the type of guessing that is forbidden is the one that is arbitrary, that in no way reflects the person’s natural needs or wishes.

Similarly, in Bava Kama, Ch. 1: “There was a story about a certain woman whose son was tormenting her, and she jumped up and swore that anyone who would come to marry her, she would not refuse, and then improper men jumped at her, and the affair was brought before the sages.  They said: ‘She meant only someone who would be proper for her.’”  This would indicate that when a guess or an omen is based on realistic criteria, it is not included in the prohibition of lo tinahashu, “do not guess at omens.”

We have before us the Torah’s first-appearing, detailed treatment of the question of how a  human being needs to operate, in stages, starting from bereshit, starting from zero, in order to build  the new existence in the new free choice.  We see here how Avraham must deal with each particular, picayune, and localized detail, must exert his own primary effort and toil in order to bury Sara, his wife.  Here are the details, the exhausting negotiations with Efron the Hittite, fully detailed and itemized to encompass the socio-political aspect as well as the financial.

To teach you that hishtadlut must address reality per se, must cope with reality as it is, and not rely on miracles.  Similarly with choosing a wife for Yitzchak, beginning with “pray, place your hand beneath my loin”, a continuation of the first active mitsva Avraham was ever commanded to fulfill. 

“And the cursed cannot attach to the blessed.”  The blessed (dynamic development) is the bearer of the new free choice.  And the cursed (the fixed condition, the closed option) is not included in this.

Therefore we must examine the details of Avraham’s slave’s conversation carefully, since Hazal teach us: “The forefathers’ slaves’ conversation is more pleasing than their descendants’ Torah.” 

This  is because positive hishtadlut constitutes a prime expression of the new free choice.  And one must divide this hishtadlut into stages, in order to learn the rules of choice.  From the essential and the private to the systematic; from examining, first and foremost, her individual quality, her character and midot, to – only afterwards – examining her relationship to the system – determining the family to which she belongs.

“And perhaps the woman will not wish to come after me?”  Do we not detect here an expression of doubt bordering on a lack of emunat hachamim, the slave’s lack of belief in his great and principal master?

What is a miracle, and what is wrong with it?  Anticipating a miracle borders on the prohibition of lo tinahashu because the new free choice demands that man recognize his own ability.  Hence his obligation to create his relationship with himself and with his environment anew every day, as partner – at the level of reciprocity – to “the One Who, in His goodness, renews the act of creation every day and constantly.” 

Relying on guessing at omens is like relying on a miracle.  It testifies to the new chooser’s doubt in and unwillingness to exercise his ability to choose and to create his existential self with his own hands.  There is here a lack of faith and a lack of confidence in the level of reciprocity in the covenant between man and his Creator.  Relating to and relying upon miracles testifies to a sense of helplessness on man’s part, to his sense that he is unable to control and to create and to be responsible for his situation.

One who prays and who requests that God grant him his needs, must do so out of a recognition of his own abilities, and of his responsibility for his own existence, and for his fellow, by the power of mutual guarantee, which determines that all things depend on him, if such were possible, out of a profound sensation of creative responsibility, both toward himself and toward the Presence of God.

Existence depends upon him, kivyachol, if such were possible, and not upon God.  Simultaneously, and hand in hand with this sensation, which derives from itaruta dilitata, he must also feel that his existence does not exist at all, that all is dependent upon the will of God Who renews his existence every day.  It is a sense of  reciprocity that is absolute.  

Everything depends on his own hishtadlut, which flows from a profound sense of responsibility on the one hand (which does not go hand in hand with the hope for a miracle) and on the other hand, a sense of belonging – in an absolute sense – to the Creator of the universe, for all is in His hands, and this sense arises out of a profound awareness of hashgaha pratit, of a personal Divine Providence that is absolute, all-encompassing, and exclusive, and that comes as a response to the initiative of free choice, which possesses the character of absolute responsibility on man’s part.

Therefore it was no guess, with the slave, but rather a prayer, and a request to acutalize his full responsibility to his master’s request.  Such a request cannot be accompanied by expectation of a miracle, and it must deal with earthly existential reality, including all its difficulties and concerns, at every step of the process as it is taking shape –  including all the “perhapses” and all the “what ifs” and all the other “God forbids”.  This examination of the two-directional unfolding of events is the meaning of “the forefathers’ slaves’ conversation is more pleasing than their descendants’ Torah,” in that it is duplicated in the sense of being two-directional, and it is therefore repeated twice in the Torah.

This brings us to a new understanding of the substance of prayer, and of  the meaning of requesting one’s needs of God.  And of why one person merits that his prayer is answered while another does not.  One stands together with Rabi Hanina ben Dosa in the category of a child who longs for his father, while another is as a slave toward his master.

Here the paradox of belief and faith is thrown into sharp relief: On the one hand, the chooser must deal with the existential process to the fullest extent of his hishtadlut capacity, through exacting and thorough treatment of all stages of the process, as with Eliezer, who dealt with the test of Rivka’s midot, and did not rely, kivyachol, on Avraham’s guidelines.  On the other hand, in the second version of the story, as told to Rivka’s family, he describes the miracle, the hand of the hashgaha, as though he himself on his part has done no hishtadlut.  Here is a key to the differences in terminology between the two versions.  For example, na’ara (with no hay) in the first version, and alma in the second version.  See Malbim, who attributes higher prestige to alma:  Na’ara with no hay refers to a mere female, to a mere category that does not relate to her personal quality.  Alma implies the daughter of a fine family, good lineage…

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